This study examines the sensitivity of future long-term-care demand and expenditure estimates to "official" demographic projections in four selected European countries:
Introduction
Population projections are increasingly important for planning a range of social policies, including pensions, health care and long-term care. Long-term care means help with domestic tasks, such as shopping and preparing meals, assistance with personal-care tasks, such as dressing and bathing, and nursing care. Long-term care constitutes a significant part of health and social care expenditure and is a key policy question in most developed societies. Studies with a European focus have examined the sensitivity of long-term care (LTC) demand and expenditure to changes in informal care patterns (Pickard et al, 2006) , dependency rates (Rothgang et al, 2003) and economic and financial reforms in four European Union countries (Comas et al, 2006) . However, very little research has been devoted to the influence of different demographic scenarios on expenditure projections.
Life Expendtancy expansion as a result of reductions in mortality rates arguably lead to an increase in age-related welfare expenditure, which could threaten the sustainability of welfare states in the long run (OECD, 1998) 1 . Long-term care is of particular importance here, given its association with the ageing process. A recent study by the European Policy Committee (2006) suggests that from 2004 to 2050 the European countries examined will experience an increase in relative expenditure on long-term care, up to an average of 1.7 percentage points of their gross domestic product (GDP), and predicts an increase in the number of elderly citizens with disabilities who are in need of care. Surprisingly, little attention is given to how changes in mortality and life expectancy affect LTC demand and expenditure 2 . Despite the fact that ageing is forecast to boost future demand for, and expenditure on, health and long-term care (Spillmann and Lubitz, 2000; Schulz et al, 2004) , projections of the number of years an individual 1 Other demographic changes, such as changes in future fertility rates, may have an impact on the availability of LTC support for informal care within families. Similarly migration rates may influence the availability of givers of formal care. However, these rates only exert an indirect influence on LTC supply and demand. 2 Some studies claim that dramatic changes in mortality will lead to an acceleration of the ageing process and an increase in welfare expenditure which will threaten the sustainability of the welfare state (OECD, 1998).
can be expected to live are found to be subject to significant uncertainty and some studies report a potential deviation of about 20% in a 30-year forecast of the total population (Alho, 2002) .
Deviations from projected figures for elderly dependent people resulting from demographic uncertainty 3 are systematically examined here. Nonetheless, they are not the only source of expenditure variability 4 . A less well-known effect is the one arising from changes in mortality rates, as lifeexpectancy estimates are key assumptions in the projections of future demand for long-term care 5 .
Differences in official projections bring to the fore the importance of dealing with demographic uncertainty -primarily resulting from mortality estimates -and ultimately lead to evaluations of the accuracy of population-based forecasts (Alho, 1990; Lee and Tuljapurkar, 1998) 6 . It seems likely that long-term trends in age-specific mortality will exhibit a downward pattern (Kinsella and Philips, 2005) 7 . However, some studies find that the relative error one can expect in age-specific mortality forecasts is higher than the error for other determinants, such as changes in fertility rates (Alho, 2003) .
It is important to examine demographic factors, given that earlier official population projections have underestimated the size of the elderly population (Benjamin, 1988; Brody, 1995; Olshansky, 1993) 8 . However, there is very little evidence in the literature demonstrating the influence of population projections on LTC demand and expenditure.
This paper examines the sensitivity of estimates of future LTC demand and expenditure in four European Union countries (Spain, Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom) to different "official population projections", which vary mainly in life expectancy and mortality assumptions 9 .
Three of the countries examined are of particular interest as they rank among the five countries in the world with the "oldest" populations 10 , and one country is taken for comparative purposes.
Given that Eurostat demographic scenarios are extensive and standardised, the study takes them as reference points for comparison with the country-specific scenarios. It contributes to the literature by comparing LTC projections and expenditure under different patterns of life expectancy across the countries under examination, and by using a specific macro-simulation model employed elsewhere. Its findings provide evidence of the importance of demographic assumptions in projecting the burden of LTC expenditure and demand. It also finds that variability in expenditure projections is higher for the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany than for Italy and Spain.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 focusses on the effects of demographic uncertainty on both population and expenditure projections; Section 3 examines the projections and describes the model; Section 4 deals with the cross-country comparison; and Section 5 contains the discussion.
9 Furthermore, it specifically looks at mortality, which is considered to have a direct demographic effect, whereas fertility and migration are only considered to affect future long-term care indirectly (as argued further on in the text). 10 In 2004, Italy was the world leader, with 19.1% of the population aged 65 and over, Germany was 4th with 18.3%
and Spain was 5 th with 17.6%. The UK was the exception, holding 15 th position among the "oldest" countries with 15.7% (Kinsella and Philips, 2005) .
Uncertainty in mortality and life expectancy estimates

Mortality and demographic uncertainty
Significant improvements in health care and nutrition, among other factors, have given rise to unprecedented increases in life expectancy, although there is much debate on whether similar changes will continue to happen in the near future 11 . Mortality rates for countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have decreased for all ages in life, with the exception of the age group between 25 and 45 years. The most remarkable change for OECD countries s probably the growth of survival probabilities responsible for a 'rectangularisation' of survival curves, which seem to expand, to some extent weakening the assumption that there is a limit to human life (Hayflick, 1981 , Fries, 1980 12 . Indeed, there is still some progress in population longevity in Europe, and some experts (the proponents of 'the mortality-reduction paradigm') argue that the decline in mortality rates will continue and may even accelerate (Vaupel et al, 1986; Manton, 1991; Vaupel et al, 1994) 13 . However, new evidence from ongoing empirical research (Nusselder and Mackenbach, 2001) suggests that in the Netherlands life expectancy at age 85 has declined.
The increase in life expectancy results from an interaction with potential morbidity. Thus, if the increase in life expectancy exceeds the reduction in morbidity, one would expect to observe an increase in the burden of dependent elderly people, and consequently in LTC expenditure. Empirical evidence suggests that both compression and expansion of morbidity can be observed simultaneously (Nusselder et al, 1996) . Finally, some recent research questions the influence of ageing on health expenditure by suggesting that 'the number of quarters remaining until death', rather than individual age, is a significant determinant of health expenditure (Zwiefel et al, 1999; Zwiefel et al, 2004) . However, several authors have raised methodological issues and have found that age does have a significant impact (Seshamani and Gray 2004) . Thus, future rates of improvement in mortality and life expectancy, and their effects on LTC expenditure, are still an open question.
Demographic change and long-term care: which patterns matter?
Demographic change is a well-known key driver of need for long-term care. The larger the cohort of elderly people, the larger the size of the group in need of LTC. Because of the inevitable uncertainty about the future rate of increase in the number of older people, sensitivity analysis is important in the context of projections of LTC demand and associated expenditure for the next halfcentury. This has been made clear by the fact that past population projections have sometimes under-estimated future numbers of older people, because they under-estimated improvements in mortality rates (Shaw, 1994) . It is, therefore, important to consider the impact on LCT projections of a range of population projections, especially if they cover a long period of time.
In projecting populations, different demographic scenarios are often examined, generally in the form of discrete categorisation into high, low and medium variants. It is common practice to consider the medium-variant projections to be the most likely forecasts, since national and international agencies have found they play a useful role and generally achieve some accuracy. The current practice of providing high and low variants to communicate uncertainty around the medium projection, although having some drawbacks (Lutz and Goldstein, 2004) , gives an indication of potential patterns of demographic change. Although variants are arguably non-specific about the probability range (e.g., do not usually allow for temporal fluctuations such as 'baby booms'), the dominant approach in forecasting has been to rely on formal models extrapolating historical trends.
a) Fertility rates
Since those who will be aged 65 and over in the future (e.g., in 2050) are alive today, recent patterns of fertility at country level must be taken into account when projecting future population
figures. This particularly applies to the time when 'baby booms', occurred in different countries.
Alho (2003) Between 1980 and 1998, fertility decline was significantly lower in Northern and Western
Europe than in Southern and Eastern Europe; some studies suggest that decline is higher in countries where the male-breadwinner model is strongest (Hugo, 2000) . Italy has the lowest fertility rate in the European Union (EU-15), but almost all of its fellow member states, including UK, Spain, and Germany, are projected to depopulate over this century. Nevertheless, in disentangling the influence of fertility on LTC demand and expenditure, it is important to distinguish between "future fertility" and "past fertility". Indeed, whilst past fertility is irrelevant, future fertility will affect the availability of informal caregivers within households. Yet, as indicated in the introduction, future fertility as a form of demographic change will exert indirect effects.
14 Some evidence indicates that from 1980-98 EU-15 experienced an overall decline in fertility of more than 20 per cent (Hugo, 2000) . However, the period during which fertility exerted a significant effect on population expansion differs from country to country. 15 In the UK, baby boomers are the generation born between 1945 and 1965. During this time some 18.5 million children were born in the UK, with two peaks in the birth rate in 1947 and 1964.
b) Migration
Projected migration rates may affect the number of older people in the future. However, evidence of the effect of migration on population growth in Europe is heterogeneous across the four countries examined. In the UK and Germany, second-generation migrant births already account for between 10 and 13 per cent of total births. In Germany and Italy, migration contributes twice as much to population growth as natural increase (Hugo, 2000) . This feature is particularly striking given that, although migrants are mainly younger people, many of those migrating in the first quarter of this century will be elderly people by 2050.
Future levels of immigration are inevitably uncertain, as they depend partly on events that happen in other countries. However, they are not the most important source of uncertainty in projecting numbers of elderly people 16 . Furthermore, countries may not be seen as independent units with respect to international migration. On the other hand, the importance of welfare issues should not be lightly dismissed; the benefits of public access to long-term care in the future might be linked to migration policy decisions. Finally, as some authors point out, immigration-flow estimates can differ considerably depending on whether one looks at the statistics of the sending country or the receiving country (Poulain, 1993) .
Even so, migration into Western societies means that there are more potential caregivers available, provided that migrants are low-skilled and willing to take any sort of job to remain in the destination country. Accordingly, the impact of migration on long-term care rather than being direct, is made indirectly through its effects on the availability of care giving.
c) Mortality
Projected mortality rates are key figures in forecasting numbers of older people. A hypothetical decline in mortality rates, together with the impact of past 'baby booms', could explain the differences in projections of numbers of older people over the coming decades 17 . The decline in mortality rates is explained by the "survival of the fittest " hypothesis, and by a deceleration in aging at very old ages (Kinsella and Philips, 2005) . However, out of the three main causes of demographic change, reduction of mortality rates is the only factor that directly affects potential demand for LTC. Indeed, a reduction in mortality rates means an increase in the share of population in need of LTC, primarily those aged 80 or older.
Demographic projections and life expectancy in four European Union countries
General Assumptions
This study uses the Eurostat 1999-based population projections for the central or baseline, high and low scenarios on fertility, mortality and migration up to 2050. The high scenario assumes high fertility, mortality and migration, and the low scenario assumes the opposite. The use of Eurostat population projections, rather than the official national figures, should facilitate comparisons between countries. Furthermore, the Eurostat projections were also used by the Eurostat population projections incorporate assumptions on future fertility rates, life expectancy and migration. Although fertility rates currently differ substantially between the different EU countries, they are expected to converge by 2050, reaching 1.5 in Germany, Spain and Italy, and 1.8 in the UK. A recent study examining low-lowest fertility in Europe identified a cluster of European countries with low-lowest fertility, in particular Italy and Spain, that also exhibited the latest late home-leaving behaviour, and had only a limited proportion of women participating in the labour market (Billari and Kolher, 2004) . However, as indicated above, fertility is not necessarily relevant in projecting LTC expenditure.
Migration is country-specific and connected with EU economic development. Net immigration over most of the period to 2050 is forecast to be 200,000 per year in Germany, 60,000 per year in Spain, 80,000 per year in Italy and 70,000 per year in the UK.
The key issue for LTC projections, however, is the prediction of mortality rates and life Table 1 . The high and low variants of the Eurostat projections are based on different assumptions about future fertility, net migration and life expectancy. These variants represent the two "plausible extremes" of demographic change: the "high" scenario assumes high migration rates, high fertility rates and high life expectancy, while the "low" scenario is characterised by low migration, fertility and life expectancy. However, base-case projections are based on the "best hypotheses" and are comparable on an international level.
Official national population projections are included as a further variant in the sensitivity analysis, though these are not designed to be comparable between countries. National projections tend to be based on a variety of assumptions, but some country-specific studies are based on these data. The use of the national projections, therefore, provides additional input for the sensitivity analysis.
For consistency purposes, the study used projected, instead of released, data for 2000. Figure 2 summarises the main sources of demographic change.
[Insert Table 1 Table 1 shows the life expectancy projections for each country under the three different Eurostat variant scenarios and the official national forecasts. As expected, they indicate that life expectancy will be systematically higher for women than for men, although in most variants the gender gap narrows slightly in the fifty years under consideration, because life expectancy for men is rising faster than for women. Base-case data for the year 2000 show that life-expectancy for women was highest in Spain (82.1), followed by Italy, Germany and the UK. Life-expectancy for men was highest in Italy (75.5) followed by the UK, Spain and Germany. Over the period 2000 to 2050 there is a convergence process: life expectancy for men converges across countries to 80 years (79 for Spain, 81 for Italy) and life expectancy for women converges to 85 years (86 for Italy).
However, as life expectancy depends on mortality, different assumptions on mortality could play a role in life-expectancy changes. As Figure 1 suggests, with the exception of Spain, increases in life expectancy will vary from 10-11% in the high scenario to 2-4% in the low scenario. Furthermore changes appear to be more marked for women than for men.
Model description
Our macro-simulation model has a common structure for all four countries. It is divided broadly into three parts: the projected number of dependent elderly people; the estimated volume of services they will require; and the estimated expenditure that those services would involve.
The first part of the model classifies the number of older people projected for each country into groups by age, gender, dependency, and (in some of the models) other characteristics.
The second part of the model classifies the services that would be received by dependent older people into three groups: informal care; formal services provided to people in their own home; and institutional care.
The third part of the model calculates the expenditure that would be required to pay for those services, by applying unit costs to each of them. All four countries cover a range of LTC services for people aged 65 or over. The model covers, as far as is possible, both public and private sector provision and funding of services. It includes: informal care by family and friends (although it does not include the costs of providing informal care); services provided to people who live in their own homes; and services provided to those living in institutions.
Cash allowances have only been included when there is a specific choice between cash and services, as in the German system. The rationale behind this is that in Germany, since the value of services on offer is higher than the cash allowance, people are unlikely to use their cash allowances to purchase formal care. Disability benefits in the UK and Italy, however, are often used as payments for private care or to meet public sector charges, and are therefore not alternatives to care. Their inclusion in total expenditure would produce double counting. 
Spain
The Spanish population projections were calculated by Fernández Cordon (2000) (see Appendix: Table   A4 ). 18 There is a downward trend in birth and death rates in Spain. As in most Southern European countries, this trend started some decades later than in the more developed European countries, but at the end of the 1980s there was a sharp drop in birth rates, which was greater than in any other EU country. (Until 1900, birth and death rates in Spain were still very high, in both cases exceeding 30%, as is typical of a pre-industrial underdeveloped society. There were also significant differences between Spanish regions 19 ).
Interestingly, the mortality assumptions underlying the Spanish country-based population projections assumed higher mortality rates than Eurostat, while life-expectancy estimates were consistently below the Eurostat base case, and sometimes even below the low-case Eurostat scenario.
18 The projections were based on constant migration assumptions and a linear growth in life expectancy. Fertility showed a smoothly increasing pattern, rising from 1.14 in 2000 to 1.72 in 2030 and from then onwards remained constant. 19 Whilst Catalonia and the Balearic Islands embarked on industrial development before 1900, areas such as Andalusia, the Canary Islands and Extremadura did not follow suit until the 1920s.
Italy
The population projections for Italy were prepared by ISTAT (Previsioni della popolazione residente, 2000) (see Appendix: Table A2 ). Their estimates assumed constant migration, and an increase in life expectancy both for males and females up to 2030. In 2030, male life expectancy was projected to be 81.4 years and female life expectancy 88.1 years. Since the 'baby boom' started around 1965 in Italy, it is expected to affect the number of people aged 65 and over during the period 2030-2040. According to the official projections, projected expansion in life expectancy was among the lowest for the EU countries considered here. However, it was one of the highest when Eurostat projections were used.
Germany
According to Eurostat, life expectancy in Germany was projected to rise by 5.3 years for men While Eurostat started with a lower number of elderly people (65 years and older) for 2000 (13.3 million as compared to 13.7 million in the national projection), it projected 21.8 million, which was 2.3 million higher than the number projected by the Federal Office of Statistics. According to Eurostat the number of older people will grow slightly between 2030 and 2050 (+ 419,000), 20 The projection also contained an "alternative" scenario with an additional gain in life expectancy of 2 years (men) and 1.9 years (women) until 2050. The above discussion, however, is based on the standard case. With respect to migration, a high scenario (+ 200,000 foreign (net) migrants per year) and a low scenario (+ 100,000 foreign (net) migrants per year) were distinguished, as well as a control scenario with no net migration of foreigners. The reference above is to the highmigration scenario. The fertility rate was kept constant at 1.4 for all scenarios.
whereas according to national projections this number will decline (-844,000). In both sets of projections, however, there was the same shift in age structure within the older population: while the estimated number of 65-80 year-old people decreased sharply between 2030 and 2050, the estimated number of the very old (80 years and older) rose correspondingly. This produced an overall increase in the projected number of dependent people even for these decades, assuming constant age-specific dependency rates.
United Kingdom
The Government Actuary's Department produces regular population projections for the United Kingdom (see Table A1 ). The latest set, which were 2000-based projections, assumed that the total fertility rate would fall to 1. 
The effect of variant population predictions on projected numbers of dependent older people and on projected LTC expenditure
Effect on the dependent elderly population
The use of variant population projections has a significant impact on the projected numbers of dependent older people in 2030 and 2050 (Figure 4 ). The numbers of dependent older people in each country under the four different population projection scenarios are plotted in Figure 4 , assuming constant dependency rates by age and gender. Figure 5 shows the changes in numbers of dependent elderly people. Under the base case, the number of dependent elderly people was projected to rise between 2000 and 2050 by 87% in the UK, 102% in Spain, 107 % in Italy and 121% in Germany. The differences between countries are due partly to differences in the Eurostat population projections (as discussed above) and partly to differences in the definition of dependency. Official projections indicated only a slight population change in the UK and Spain as compared with the base case.
However, this did not apply in Italy and Germany. Interestingly, with the exception of the UK, the "high" scenario prediction indicated a rise of over 140%.
There was a significant difference between the high and low Eurostat population projections for dependent older people in 2050, as Figure 4 shows. The number of dependent older people in Germany was projected to rise from around 1.4 million in 2000 to 2.5 million (low scenario), 3.1 million (base scenario), and 3.7 million (high scenario). The number of dependent elderly people in Spain was projected to rise from around 2.3 million in 2000 to 3.9 million (low), 4.7 million (base) and 5.6 million (high). The number of dependent elderly people in Italy was projected to rise from around 1.5 million in 2000 to 2.7 million (low), 3.2 million (base) and 3.8 million (high). Finally, the number of dependent elderly people in the UK was projected to rise from around 3.0 million in 2000 to 4.8 million (low), 5.6 million (base) and 6.8 million (high).
The projected numbers of dependent elderly people for Spain and the UK did not vary greatly between the official national population projections and the Eurostat base-scenario population projections. For Germany, the official national population projections predicted somewhat fewer dependent older people in 2050 than the Eurostat base population projections. For Italy, the official national population projections suggested substantially more dependent older people in 2050 than the Eurostat base population projections and were closer to the Eurostat high projections.
Expenditure projections
The second main aspect to examine is the total effect of the variant population projections on projected LTC expenditure relative to GDP (Table 2) [Insert Table 2 about here] Figure 6 provides a measure of relative dispersion (coefficient of variation) of relative expenditure to GDP and expenditure growth. It reveals that in UK and Germany the variability of population projections was higher, and that in the UK case it more than doubled that of Italy and Spain. However, the relative variability of expenditure growth was far more stable, though it exhibited similar patterns to that of relative expenditure to GDP. These results are interesting, given that levels of expenditure in Southern European countries were significantly lower, yet results might be more sensitive to factors such as social change (Pickard et al, 2006) . On the other hand, it is important to note that the variability in expenditure relative to GDP was larger than that of expenditure change, indicating that potential changes in the economic size of countries were an additional source of uncertainty in projecting LTC expenditure.
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
Discussion
This paper examines the effect of changes in predictions of mortality (life expectancy) on LTC demand and expenditure. In particular, it examines the sensitivity of projected numbers of dependent older people and of LTC expenditure to the use of variant population projections based on different assumptions about future mortality rates (and migration patterns). Other studies have examined the effects of social change (Pickard et al, 2006) , policy options and financing scenarios (Comas et al, 2006) , and changes in health and disability assumptions (Rothgang et al, 2003) . However, demographic assumptions have been largely dismissed in previous studies.
To ensure comparability, the study employs the Eurostat standardised scenarios (high, base and low). Interestingly, it finds evidence of significant demographic uncertainty, associated with the use of different mortality assumptions, in projections of LTC demand and expenditure.
To examine the sensitivity of government future planning to differences in demographic assumptions, it then examines the difference between Eurostat-based figures, and those obtained when national official population projections are employed. Predictably, it finds that countryspecific official projections also produce different LTC expenditure figures.
This reinforces the hypothesis that population-projection assumptions are responsible for the variability of projected expenditure, in both absolute and relative terms. Some caveats should be mentioned, mainly the need to examine demographic effects jointly with changes in economic activity in future work, given that economic activity could be endogenously influenced by changes in population scenarios 21 . Clearly, the increase in old-age dependency is likely to lead to higher demand for, and expenditure on LTC services. However, the extent to which this will imply a significant change in GDP will strongly depend on whether long-term care is covered by a shift from other activities or by an increase in migration.
21 However, though it is true that GDP is partly a function of a country's population (countries with more people than projected will tend to have larger GDPs) given that population expansion occurs mainly within the old-age cohorts it is debatable whether GDP can be expected to change much overall. • Prevalence rates of dependency by age and gender remain unchanged.
• The proportion of older people by age and gender living in each household type remains constant 22 .
Demand for services • The proportion of older people receiving informal care, formal community-care services and residential and nursing-home care remains constant for each sub-group by age, gender and dependency.
Supply of services
• The supply of formal care will adjust to match demand 23 .
• Demand will be no more constrained by supply in the future than in the base year.
Expenditure and economic context
• The unit costs of care will rise in line with the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) assumption 24 for productivity growth in each country, and GDP will also rise in line with EPC assumptions. These assumptions are country-specific, but based on a common methodology.
22 This assumption only operates explicitly in the UK model, but it is implicit in the other three models. 23 The models assume that the real rise in wages and other payments for care will ensure that supply is sufficient. Changes in assumptions about unit costs are made as part of the sensitivity analysis. 
